Eye of the Storm
Speeches
11 Mar 1998
Eye of the Storm
Joseph Yam, Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(Speech at Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office and British Invisibles Seminar, London)
Eye of the Storm
- In the lead up to the Handover, we had often been asked the
question as to what came after 1997 or what came after 1 July 1997.
To demonstrate confidence in the future of Hong Kong under the twin
principles of "one country two systems" and "Hong Kong people
running Hong Kong", which are enshrined in the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law, we often replied robustly with punch lines -
what came after 1997 must of course be 1998 or what came after 1
July 1997 must of course be 2 July 1997. This is an effective way
of saying that things in Hong Kong would largely remain unchanged
after the Handover.
- Specifically on the monetary front, given that, with superb,
quiet, close and effective Sino-British cooperation we had
strengthened our monetary system and prepared ourselves as well as
anyone could, one punch line that I had often used is that 1997
would turn out to be very dull. Well, I was wrong. The year, at
least the second half of the year, has not been dull at all. The
first of July 1997 was indeed followed by the second of July. But
as the celebration of the Handover ended on 1 July, the worst
financial turmoil in the history of Asia broke on 2 July.
- Thankfully, I was wrong also for the wrong reason. The
financial turmoil did not originate from Hong Kong because of the
political transition. Hong Kong was the least and the last to be
affected by the financial turmoil in Asia. If anything, many have
since considered Hong Kong or the Hong Kong dollar as the pillar of
stability in the region and a sterling example of financial
prudence, the eye of the storm or an oasis of calm in a region of
financial turbulence.
- This audience is I am sure well aware of the efforts put in,
ahead of the Handover, to make sure that the stability and
prosperity of Hong Kong could be maintained after the Handover -
the negotiations leading to the Joint Declaration, the promulgation
of the Basic Law for Hong Kong, the work of the Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group and the many discussions and meticulous preparations
amongst the technical experts within that co operative
framework.
- Specifically on the monetary front, it was the joint effort of
the technical experts on both sides, working together closely and
quietly for a period of over ten years, reforming the monetary
system, that have enabled Hong Kong to be in this relatively
comfortable position as the storm swept through the region with
such force, with particularly the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate
remaining so stable as the currencies of our Asian neighbours
tumbled one after another. This is a successful piece of history of
Sino-British cooperation that may have been overlooked with the
passage of time, and perhaps because of the lack of publicity at
the time, which was deliberate, given that one would need to be
extremely careful about discussions on issues which could be highly
market sensitive. I had the privilege of being closely involved in
these technical discussions in various capacities throughout,
initiating and seeing through the implementation of a series of
monetary reform measures, and building up a monetary armoury which
has, and in the crucial year of 1997, in the days and months just
after the Handover, proven to be most useful and effective. On this
score, at least, I was right.
The Currency Board System of Hong Kong
- But there had been controversies as well, as the automatic
defence mechanism of our currency board system inflicted the
inevitable interest rate pain across all sectors of the economy and
the community, hurting speculators shorting the currency as well as
the innocent borrowers paying mortgages. These controversies arose
for two main reasons. First, the manner in which the automatic
adjustment mechanism of the currency board system operates is not
something that is widely understood. Second, the monetary reform
measures in the past ten years or so, carefully introduced to
strengthen that automatic mechanism in order to cope with modern
day financial arrangements in which financial transactions are
predominantly conducted electronically and globally rather than
physically through the use of bank notes, had been misinterpreted
by some to be a shift away from the rule-based currency board
system to a central banking system involving discretionary monetary
management.
- As you know, the currency board system requires the monetary
base, which should be clearly defined, to be backed 100% by foreign
currency assets. More importantly, it requires the operator of the
currency board, in our case the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA), to allow the monetary base to be increased or decreased
only when foreign currency reserves are sold to it or bought from
it respectively at or around a fixed exchange rate. And throughout
this process, the HKMA is to be the passive party to those foreign
currency transactions. But for the currency board system to be
effective in maintaining exchange rate stability, having regard to
modern day financial arrangements, the monetary base must include a
crucial element. This is what we refer to in Hong Kong as the
clearing balance of the banking system. It is the totality of the
balances in the clearing accounts maintained by all the banks with
the HKMA for the purpose of the settlement of interbank
transactions, and also transactions between the banks and the
HKMA.
- It was only through monetary reform in 1988 that the clearing
balance of the banking system was made subject to the discipline of
the currency board system; in additional to currency in circulation
being subject to that discipline when the linked exchange rate
system was introduced in 1983. The HKMA was aware of the possible
misinterpretation of its intentions when introducing reforms that
also put it in the position, albeit unintentionally, of being able
to create money or conduct open market operations of the central
banking type. This is quite understandable, given always the risk,
so evident in other jurisdictions, of political interference on
monetary management for a political objective, although this is
highly unlikely in view of our legal and institutional framework,
and the high degree of transparency in the HKMA's operations. And
the nature of these esoteric issues is such that nobody cares when
things are going normally, but everybody would instantly become an
expert when there is, as in the case of the currency attack last
October, unusual pain.
- So, encouraged by the Administration that has been politically
responsive to the plight of the community and called for a review
of our currency defence, rather critical comments had been
forthcoming. Many accused the HKMA for messing around, and offered
schemes for maintaining stability in the exchange rate and interest
rates at the same time, thereby relieving the pain so heartlessly
heaved by the HKMA at the economy, at the borrowers, particularly
those having to spend a substantial part of their household income
in mortgage payments. The call for a review was of course
politically timely. And I suppose after ten years of continuous
reform behind the scenes, a more public debate on the technical
issues would serve a useful political purpose, if only to confirm
the effectiveness of the efforts in the past, as long as the
downside risk of creating a damaging impression that something has
gone wrong on the monetary front could be managed.
- Thankfully, supportive words from the international financial
community, in particular endorsements from authoritative sources on
how we handled the currency attack last October, gave us the
vindication on the robustness of our system. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF), in its report on the Article IV Consultations
on Hong Kong in 1997, conducted interestingly right after the
currency attack, said specifically that "it is important to
recognize that allowing interest rates to rise in response to
exchange market pressure is an essential element of the currency
board mechanism that lies in the heart of Hong Kong's monetary
arrangements. Recent events demonstrate that the system is working
exactly as intended..." Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of
the IMF, praised the Hong Kong dollar link as a pillar of
stability, a sentiment very much shared, publicly and privately, by
leading central bank governors and finance ministers. Wim
Duisenburg of the European Monetary Institute was in Hong Kong at
my invitation to deliver the HKMA Distinguished Lecture earlier
this year and he advised the Administration to "stick to your
guns". I appreciate these comments very much.
Controversies
- But I also appreciate the many ideas for improvement put
forward by others, particularly those by the academic community in
Hong Kong. There were suggestions for the HKMA to sell insurance
products, guarantees, structured notes, options and other
derivatives, so to speak, to put our money where our mouth is, in
holding the exchange rate fixed to the US dollar at HK$7.80 to
US$1. Such a demonstration of confidence, it was argued, would
bring down Hong Kong dollar interest rates to levels closer to
those for the US dollar.
- But I doubt very much whether this would be a demonstration of
confidence on the exchange rate system or, as others have pointed
out, a demonstration of weakness. It could be seen as a lack of
resolve to defend the currency and bear the necessary interest rate
pain. Keeping interest rates artificially down when there is
capital outflow amounts to providing cheap funding to those who are
shorting the currency. These derivative products, however they are
structured, in effect amount to discretionary intervention in the
forward foreign exchange market, involving possibly an
uncontrollable commitment of foreign reserves that even those with
very large reserves would find the situation difficult to hold.
This was the mistake of one or two Asian economies now in financial
difficulty.
- The academics have further argued that the contingent liability
arising from these currency derivatives can be contained by
limiting it to a credible amount and possibly also by suitably
pricing them. But the fact of the matter is that the limited supply
of such derivatives would benefit only those with access to the
product and that there will be irresistible political demands, on
grounds of equity, for supplying it to all. This process is likely
to end in misery rather than greater confidence in the currency
link. The pricing of the derivative product is also a tricky issue.
If one allows the free market to price the product, by auction or
by tender, chances are that the price would reflect the market
interest rate differential between the Hong Kong dollar and the US
dollar, which would defeat the original purpose of the product in
trying to dampen the interest rate pain. If alternatively the
pricing of the product is administratively determined, involving
possibly a subsidy, then the difficulty is again to target
equitably a group of beneficiaries entitled to the comfort afforded
by the product.
- A related area of controversy is whether or not the currency
board should also be the provider of liquidity at the end of the
day to assist banks that occasionally find themselves short of
funds for settling outstanding interbank transactions. The HKMA has
built and is running a real time gross settlement payment system
which is one of the most robust interbank clearing systems in the
world. This is a very important piece of financial infrastructure
contributing greatly to financial stability in Hong Kong. But in
doing so it might have given the impression that the HKMA, as
operator of the currency board, is also the lender of last resort,
something that the purists would object to. However, putting aside
whether the HKMA is or is not the lender of last resort, we have to
accept the reality of modern day finance underpinned by
sophisticated information technology and the undisputed
responsibility for monetary authorities over the "plumbing" of the
financial system. The realistic answer to this complex question
lies in the HKMA ensuring that any such provision of liquidity
should be infrequent, suitably priced and secured by assets backed
by foreign reserves. Without going into the technicalities of the
relevant arrangements in Hong Kong, I can assure you that this is
indeed the case.
- Another controversy concerns the level of exchange rate at
which the HKMA establishes its passive presence in the foreign
exchange market and allows the automatic adjustment mechanism of
the currency board system to be triggered by passively taking in US
dollars from or selling US dollars to the banks. Some have
suggested that the HKMA should always be present at just the fixed
exchange rate of HK$7.80 to US$1. This would mean, however, that
each and every foreign exchange deal would be transacted with the
HKMA, thereby killing off the foreign exchange market involving the
Hong Kong dollar altogether. So, in line with Hong Kong's free
market philosophy, we have chosen to leave the foreign exchange
market alone under normal circumstances and the exchange rate to
fluctuate in accordance with the forces of supply and demand. But
this does mean that under circumstances considered abnormal by the
HKMA, the automatic adjustment mechanism would be triggered by the
HKMA establishing its passive presence, not necessarily at, but
around, the fixed exchange rate level. There is thus a degree of
what I would call "constructive ambiguity" that does not involve
any meaningful departure from the discipline of the currency board
system. And I see no reason why I should show all my cards to the
speculators.
Interest Rates
- Hong Kong's currency board system has no doubt insulated the
Hong Kong dollar from the process of competitive devaluation of
Asian currencies. But we obviously have to pay a price and this is
in the form of higher interest rates. When the speculative currency
attack spread to Hong Kong in October last year, sparked off by
Taiwan allowing its currency to depreciate, our interest rate for
overnight money were bid up by those shorting the Hong Kong dollar
to almost 300%. This, however, lasted for only around an hour. As
the shorters realized that the only way whereby Hong Kong dollar
liquidity could be provided to the interbank market, as dictated by
the discipline of our currency board system, was for them to square
their short Hong Kong dollar positions by selling US dollars back
to the HKMA, the speculative pressure receded as quickly as it
came.
- But the market has since factored in an Asian premium in Hong
Kong dollar interest rates over those for the US dollar, reflecting
the perception of risk that the Hong Kong dollar may be swept along
in the financial storm of Asia. This is notwithstanding the
robustness of the currency board system which requires 100% backing
for the monetary base by foreign reserves and the very substantial
reserves that we have, which currently amount to about 800% rather
than just 100% cover for the monetary base. The interest rate
premium also reflects the higher credit risk of borrowers in an
economy that is less buoyant and the funding risk for the lender in
case short term interest rates are bid up to very high levels again
as a result of another attack on our currency. But that premium has
since been on a declining trend, with spasmodic blips of decreasing
amplitude as sentiment was affected by ripples from Indonesia or
Korea or rumours about a possible devaluation of the renminbi
(RMB), the currency of the Mainland of China. Currently, the
interest rate premium for the Hong Kong dollar over the US dollar
ranges from 170 basis points for three-month interbank money to 230
basis points for a ten-year Hong Kong dollar issue over the
corresponding US Treasuries. But for short term interbank money,
for example overnight money, there is in fact a discount of around
140 basis points because of continued capital inflow.
- You may be surprised to hear of the capital inflow. Indeed, we
have been accumulating foreign reserves that grew from US$82.9
billion in the middle of last year to US$92.8 billion at the end of
the year. Perhaps there has been a flight to quality, with Hong
Kong being very much regarded as the typhoon shelter of the region.
And the higher longer-term interest rates of a currency that is
holding stable against the US dollar are clearly an added
attraction. Furthermore, notwithstanding the rather sharp downward
adjustment of asset prices seen recently, which is the inevitable
outcome of some irrational exuberance in the past and so arguably
beneficial for the longer term, the stock and property markets
seemed to have quickly found its new equilibrium levels and
stabilized. Whilst the sharpness of the falls is unpleasant to all,
it is also a reflection of the efficiency of the markets concerned.
In any case, taken over a longer period, the falls in the Hong Kong
markets were less than that of most other markets in the region.
There has also been limited damage to the financial system,
particularly the banks, which have been exceedingly well managed,
working closely within the prudential supervisory framework of the
HKMA, and again well prepared for possible financial disturbance
over the sensitive period of political transition.
Economic Outlook
- That is why the Hong Kong economy is not expected to be
severely affected by the turmoil. The official forecast, which has
a higher batting average than most other forecasts, on the growth
rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998 has just been put
at 3.5% in real terms - a very respectable growth rate under the
circumstances, although somewhat below the 5.2% recorded for 1997.
As a result, inflation will continue to ease to about 5%. The
fiscal budget will still be in surplus, albeit a smaller one than
those in previous years, after major tax cuts. The unemployment
rate currently at around 2.5% may edge up, perhaps significantly,
or should I say the over-employment situation may ease; but,
however one sees it, I hope unemployment would not become a serious
concern. No significant adverse movement is expected on the balance
of payments position, notwithstanding the substantial devaluation
in the Asian currencies. This should not be surprising given that
Hong Kong is now very much a service oriented economy, which should
be less sensitive to exchange rate changes than a manufacturing
economy. The notion that exchange rate changes are inversely
correlated to the balance of payments position is, as economics
textbooks would tell us, not necessarily true.
Exchange Rate Policy
- Thus the economic outlook for Hong Kong is a lot better than
many of our Asian neighbours. And in the context of Asian financial
turmoil this must bring into question whether there was any point
to the competitive devaluation that they had gone through. Indeed,
many have underestimated the extent of hedging that could be
generated when currencies which had been operating on fixed
exchange rates are floated, particularly when there is perceived to
be structural problems in the economies concerned. The situation
had been exacerbated by financial liberalization that had not been
accompanied by the building of a robust monetary management
mechanism, a modern framework of prudential supervision and a
sophisticated financial infrastructure for moving money and
financial instruments safely and efficiently. The result is a
financial system that is highly vulnerable to the volatility of
capital flows. And so we saw the free fall of currencies and assets
which has been so devastating for some of our Asian neighbours.
Mistakes might have been made in economic management in individual
countries, but none so serious as to justify the slashing of the
international value of the assets of a country by as much as 80%
within half a year and leaving it further in huge foreign debt and
cripplingly high domestic interest rates.
- Indeed, there has been much talk recently about currency
stabilization arrangements in the region, while the strong medicine
prescribed by the IMF is being taken. There have been interesting
ideas proposed, some more realistic than others, and we in Hong
Kong are observing these with keen interest. Where appropriate, we
are prepared to share our experience quietly with others, spelling
out the pros and cons, the pre-conditions, and the practical
issues, for example, for operating the currency board system that
has been the hallmark of stability for Hong Kong.
- On this particular issue, one thing is clear, at least to us:
the financial technology of today is highly different from the days
when the settlement of financial transactions in the economies
operating with currency boards was done predominantly in currency
notes. When large financial transactions are settled almost
exclusively through electronic means, the mechanism for maintaining
exchange rate stability in a currency board system operates through
the interbank payment system. The control, albeit a rule-based and
passive one, of the currency board on the clearing balance of the
banking system, the crucial element of the monetary base I have
identified earlier, is essential. What ensures exchange rate
stability in a modern day currency board system is no longer the
mechanism of currency notes arbitrage which featured prominently in
the literature of currency board systems of the old days.
- Furthermore, a currency board is not a panacea for financial
ills. A currency board imposes very strict disciplines on the
financial system and the rest of the economy, not to mention on
those controlling the purse strings of the economies concerned. You
need a banking system that is in a position to understand, identify
and manage interest rate risks. You need an administration that is
prepared to give up discretionary monetary controls. You need
fiscal discipline. You need solvent private sector corporations
that are well capitalized, lowly leveraged and willing to take the
interest rate pain.
- The bitter experience of others in the region is perhaps a
sharp reminder to Hong Kong that the exchange rate link must be
kept. This is obviously for our own good, but I imagine also for
the good of the region and possibly beyond, for if the Hong Kong
dollar's fixed link with the US dollar were to be broken, the
likelihood of yet another shock wave of gigantic dimensions
sweeping across financial markets worldwide cannot be
dismissed.
- Thus the interest rate premium seen now in Hong Kong is
relatively speaking a small price to pay. And in fact it can be
even smaller if the level of confidence in the currency link
itself, in the Administration's unwavering determination to
maintain it, in the high level of reserves backing the currency, in
the robustness of the monetary management mechanism under the
currency board arrangement, in the prudential standards of banking
and other financial regulation in Hong Kong, in the sophisticated
financial infrastructure which has been painstakingly built up over
the years, in the fiscal discipline that Hong Kong is so firm in
adhering to, etc., etc., could be further enhanced.
- Support and understanding on the part of the international
financial community, not only on the technicalities of our robust
system, but also on the wider implications on world financial
order, will of course be helpful; and so I look forward to your
assisting us in promoting more widely the true picture which has
often been distorted by the frustratingly forthcoming views of the
uninformed who may have a pecuniary interest in volatility. Prudent
businessmen, particularly those engaged in international trade, in
both visibles and invisibles, hate volatility, especially exchange
rate volatility. It is therefore also in your interest to promote
stability.
- As mentioned earlier, we are already getting a lot of support
on this from the multilateral financial institutions such as the
IMF and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and also from
the central banking fraternity. The authorities in the Mainland of
China, in particular, have been excellent in their support for Hong
Kong, through their faithful compliance with the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law. They have left us alone in conducting our own
affairs. There are no telegrams to read and respond "deskby". There
is no need for seeking approvals in accordance with the Royal
Instructions and the Ordinances featuring the Secretary of State,
for these powers have either been localized or are absent in the
Basic Law. There are no requests for detailed briefings or for
explanations on why we do this and why we do that; not that, I
hasten to add, there were such requests under British
Administration. But instead, as before the Handover, there are
sincere and helpful expressions of confidence in our ability to
handle our own affairs, kind and forthcoming offers for help in
defending our currency in case we need it - and this is somewhat
different from before the Handover - to the extent of giving access
to their substantial foreign reserves. Their clear statement that
the RMB will not be devalued is also partly made out of concern of
the possible psychological implications on the Hong Kong dollar,
although there indeed is no need for any devaluation.
One Country, Two Currencies
- Perhaps it will be useful if I go into the subject of whether
or not there is a need for the RMB to be devalued in greater
detail. There have been an abundance of praises on China's
responsible attitude in maintaining stability in the RMB. These
came from the IMF, the World Bank, G-7 and others. But there are as
many predictions that the RMB will soon be devalued,
notwithstanding assurances to the contrary by Chinese President
Jiang Zimin, Premier Li Peng, Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji and others
Members of the State Council, and Governor Dai Xianglong and other
officials of the People's Bank of China. In this connection, the
skeptics rather cynically reminded us that, in the monetary history
of the world, devaluations of currencies were frequently preceded
by strong denials and that these matters are determined by market
forces and not by the words of government officials. Furthermore,
they predicted that the Hong Kong dollar's link to the US dollar
would not be able to hold if the RMB is devalued.
- For myself, I am not going to hold my breath waiting for that
to happen. Neither am I taking the assurances of the Chinese
leaders on their face value. I would look at the facts at hand and
I would like to share them with you, if I may. First, there are
still exchange controls in the Mainland of China in the capital
account. Technically this makes it easier for the exchange rate to
be kept at a particular level, especially when the People's Bank of
China has at its disposal US$140 billion of foreign reserves, the
second largest in the world after Japan. It would be very difficult
for anybody to take a short position in the RMB and so the RMB is
not exposed to any risk of speculative attacks.
- Second, China has strong economic fundamentals supporting the
exchange rate for RMB. Economic growth in 1998, forecasted to be 8%
in real terms, is only a shade below the growth rate of 8.8%
achieved in 1997. Furthermore, inflation is expected to be below
3%. In 1997, the Mainland of China ran a trade surplus of over
US$40 billion, equivalent to 4.5% of GDP. Although foreign direct
investments have slowed down somewhat in 1997 to US$45 billion,
this was still very high by international standards. Its foreign
debt is only about 14% of GDP and consisting of mostly long term
loans from official sources such as the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank, and its debt service ratio is at well below 10%
of exports. The fiscal deficit in 1997 was small at below 1% of GDP
and the monetization of such deficits is now prohibited.
Interestingly, these figures are comfortably within the Maastricht
criteria.
- Third, there are political and policy considerations against a
devaluation of the RMB. A devaluation of the RMB would risk
intensifying bilateral trade friction, particularly with the United
States. The trade surplus of the Mainland of China with the United
States has risen to almost US$50 billion in 1997, very close to
Japan's trade surplus with the United States at US$55.7 billion. On
the multilateral front, a devaluation of the RMB may be seen as a
move to gain undue competitive advantage to increase its trade
share and may undermine China's efforts to re-enter the World Trade
Organization. It is apparently getting very close to that goal. It
would be in the interest of the Mainland of China to maintain a
stable value for its currency and demonstrate its readiness to be a
responsible citizen of the international financial and trading
communities. Indeed, if the Mainland of China were to devalue the
RMB, it could spark off another round of devaluation in the region.
This could be highly destabilizing for financial markets in the
region and beyond, and in the end would adversely impact upon China
itself. China realizes this and has therefore given extensive
assurances to the IMF and others that it will not devalue the
RMB.
- There is also a domestic policy consideration. The Mainland of
China has just achieved a soft landing, after 3 years of tough
battle, and brought inflation down to below 3% from double-digit
inflation. To devalue the RMB now could roll back this achievement
and re-ignite inflationary expectations again. In addition, the
import prices of capital goods and semi-finished products, which
China uses for outward processing, would go up, thereby offsetting
much of the gain from devaluation. It would also undermine
confidence in, and therefore the flow of, foreign direct investment
into the Mainland.
- Fourth, there are other less risky and more effective ways of
maintaining competitiveness. Continuing reform of the state-owned
sector, confirmed by the decision of the Party Congress in
September 1997, unleashing the powerful forces of the market, will
achieve more efficient allocation of resources and enhance
productivity of the economy. There is also continued trade reform,
liberalizing import barriers and cutting import tariff rates on
more than 4,800 product categories by over 26% effective from 1
October 1997. The reform of export tax rebates will also benefit
exporters. Continuing efforts to strengthen financial markets and
the financial infrastructure will enable more effective financial
intermediation and promote economic growth and development.
- Fifth, in any case, the competitiveness of the Mainland of
China is based on broader structural factors including underlying
factor costs, market leadership and the trade policies of major
importers. Even after the marked depreciation of Asian currencies,
labour costs in the Mainland of China is still lower than most of
Asian economies, perhaps with the exception of Indonesia. And there
is in China a continued access to a huge labour pool made up of
redundant state sector workers and surplus labour in rural areas.
The effect of devaluation on the manufacturing costs in the Asian
economies, on the other hand, are likely to be offset by higher
inflation, higher costs of imports and higher interest rates. China
has also established market leadership in a variety of products in
world markets. It is difficult to see this dominant position being
significantly eroded, particularly with the existence of
international trade barriers that limit the extent of the possible
shift of export orders from China to other Asian economies.
- All in all, the case for a devaluation of the RMB is simply not
there. In this connection, I can quite understand that the
stability or otherwise of the RMB would appear to some observers to
have implications for the Hong Kong dollar's link with the US
dollar, particularly given the economic closeness between Hong Kong
and the Mainland of China. But this does not necessarily mean that
the Hong Kong dollar will need to move in sync with the RMB, in the
highly unlikely event that the RMB is devalued. The Hong Kong
dollar is linked to the US dollar and not to the RMB. The economic
relationship has always been very close between Hong Kong and the
Mainland of China. There has always been separate currencies for
Hong Kong and the Mainland, and "one country, two currencies" is
further enshrined in the Basic Law governing Hong Kong for 50 years
after the resumption of sovereignty. The many differences between
Hong Kong and the Mainland of China argue for monetary segregation
and not monetary union. In 1994 measures were taken in the Mainland
to unify the official and market exchange rates for the RMB,
involving a de facto devaluation of the RMB of 33% on a nominal
basis and 7% on a weighted basis. But this did not affect the Hong
Kong dollar at all. As a matter of fact, in the fourteen and a half
years since the Hong Kong dollar's link was established in October
1983, the RMB has depreciated by a total of 76% against the US
dollar. So why should a devaluation of the RMB, which in any case
has been ruled out by the Chinese leaders, affect the stability of
the Hong Kong dollar's link to the US dollar now or in the
foreseeable future? For the sake of argument, even if a devaluation
of the RMB leads to greater competitiveness for the Mainland, this
would be positive for Hong Kong as the service centre for
China.
Looking Ahead
- The encouraging developments in China will continue to create
opportunities for Hong Kong that are no less significant than the
impact of China's open-door policy on us in the early 80s. The
continuation of the Mainland's reform programme for state-owned
enterprises will demand financial and corporate management services
on a massive scale. The modernization of its economy will require
effective channels of financial intermediation, domestically as
well as across international boundaries. There is therefore a great
need for efficient and safe banking, debt and equity markets. As
the international financial centre in China, with a sophisticated
financial infrastructure and a high degree of integrity in our
financial markets, encouraged by regulatory system that meet
international standards, Hong Kong is well positioned to benefit
from all this.
- The banking sector in Hong Kong is home for the great majority
of the largest international banks, all with a keen eye on the
business prospects in the Mainland and the rest of the Asian
region. The debt market in Hong Kong has been developing rapidly in
the past nine years with conscious effort on the part of the
authorities, and now we have one of the most liquid debt markets in
Asia. Although its size is still quite small, for we have been the
victim of our success in not running fiscal deficits, the market
has very good potential. With the institutionalization of savings
in Hong Kong through the introduction of Mandatory Provident Fund
schemes and the securitization of such illiquid bank assets as home
mortgages through the creation of the Hong Kong Mortgage
Corporation, the debt market is poised for another quantum leap. It
has certainly got one of the most advanced market infrastructure,
characterized by a fully computerized clearing system with a
seamless interface with the interbank real time payment system. The
Hong Kong stock market has a long history and considerable
liquidity, and has already proved to be a very successful
springboard for Chinese enterprises to tap international capital.
Hong Kong is thus in a very good position to provide the financial
and other expertise to help China as it goes through the current
phase of evolutionary transition towards a modern economy.
- The recent financial turmoil in Asia highlighted the importance
of Hong Kong's further development as an international financial
centre and the role that we can play in the region. Asian financial
crisis stemmed from inadequate risk management and poor financial
intermediation. The benefits of financial liberalization created an
euphoria that regrettably encouraged neglect of the need to promote
prudent management of financial risks and to build a robust
financial system in order to cope with the associated volatility in
financial flows. This is where Hong Kong has a lot to offer. After
the Mexican crisis which spread to emerging markets in the Asian
region, we played a key part in promoting greater awareness of the
issues that needed to be addressed - building robust monetary
management mechanisms, upgrading banking supervisory standards that
are internationally accepted and constructing sophisticated
financial infrastructures. Too late, one may say, but better be
late than never. Although there is currently much fire fighting to
do in some of the economies in the region, we must continue to look
at these longer-term issues. Already on the table for consideration
by central banks in the region are our suggestions for the creation
of a network of clearing systems for debt securities for the
region, or Asiaclear. We have also suggested the creation of a
network of real time gross settlement (RTGS) payment systems, for
whoever is ready in the move towards RTGS, to facilitate the
efficient and riskfree settlement of cross currency
transactions.
- Speaking in the City of London, which is Europe's, if not the
world's leading financial centre, it would be immodest of me to
trumpet too much of Hong Kong's virtues. London is the world's
leading centre for cross-border financial intermediation, foreign
exchange business, international bond market, trading of foreign
equities, derivatives business and insurance business. The most
Hong Kong can claim is anywhere between fourth to seventh ranking
in these areas, not bad for a city of 6.8 million people built on
top of a barren rock. There is, however, one area where Hong Kong
does claim to have an edge, not perhaps because we are big, but
because we are small. Hong Kong is the leading example in the world
of the Virtual Economy, with 84% of GDP derived from services,
compared with 72% in the US and 70.8% in the UK. With 200,000
kilometres of fibre optics linking 1,500 commercial buildings, we
already have one of the finest telecommunications infrastructure in
Asia, if not the world, thanks to British capital and technology.
Just like London, we have already mapped out our future as a
leading financial service provider, through the use of technology
and robust, efficient infrastructure.
- Unlike other financial centres, we do not see Hong Kong as a
competitor, but as a partner in free trade and free flow of
capital. London has superior services in many areas and is at the
cutting edge in financial products and innovation. Hong Kong is the
window to Asia, and is the service centre for the giants of Asia
that are just awakening, although some have just caught serious
flu. We are the channel and bridgehead through which many British
and European services are provided in Asia. We are also keen to
develop Asian services through London in partnership, not in
competition. We should remember that the HKMA was created with the
blessing and help of the Bank of England, together with the
People's Bank of China. The bond between London and Hong Kong is
therefore a historical one that will strengthen with the passage of
time.
- Thank you.