FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK

The shifting drivers of international capital flows

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October 2016 HKMA-IMF-BoE

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
The Big Picture

- Pre-Global Financial Crisis
 - Sharp growth in International capital flows.
 - Strong international co-movement of prices, flows
 - Broad-based growth in bank-to-bank lending
- Post-crisis, sharply different patterns
 - Cross-border bank lending retrenched (Bussiere et al 2016)
 - Some rebalancing of participating countries
 - Increase in international bond market financing
 - ✓ "The Second Phase of Global Liquidity" (Shin 2013)
 - ✓ Overall increase in roles of Nonbanks (IMF GFSR 2016)
- Policies environment has changed
 - Financial stability: stress tests, macro-prudential instruments
 - Monetary policy: Unconventional, ZLB

Cross border loan and international debt securities growth, AE and EM borrowers

External debt flows, all borrowers

Four-quarter moving average of quarterly growth rates, in per cent



XBL = Cross-border loans: Quarterly Growth Ratet = Adjusted Flowst / Outstanding Stockt-1; IDS = International Debt Securities: Quarterly Growth Ratet = Net Issuancet / Outstanding Stockt-1.

Sources: BIS Locational Banking Statistics by residence; BIS International Debt Securities Statistics.

Main Questions Posed in Paper

With all the changes, are capital flows safer and less prone to sharp reversals?

Perhaps should be? banks are less leveraged and better capitalized than previously; pension funds, insurance companies, money market mutual funds and hedge funds less leveraged than banks.

Particular questions examined:

- Do **drivers** of international bank flows **differ** from those of bond flows?
- Have **main drivers** of these international capital flows **changed**?
- What are the **reasons** behind the observed changes in sensitivities?
- Is it the **composition** of borrowers / lenders, or the **behavior** of the creditors?
- What role of **prudential policies** and bank **balance sheet** characteristics?

Preview of Key findings (preliminary)

- 1. Confirm global liquidity drivers (AE monetary policy, risk conditions)
- 2. Document changes in sensitivities post-crisis
 - AE monetary policy: stronger in loan and bond flows
 - Global risk conditions
 - o International Loan flows through banks: weaker
 - o International Bond flows through nonbanks: stronger
 - \checkmark convergence in sensitivities between loan and bond flows
 - ✓ total flows: remain highly risk sensitive
- 3. Role of changes in composition of borrowers and lenders (extensive margin), which had distinct sensitivities, or changes in behaviors (intensive)? In loans:
 - Creditors have changed their pattern of responses to global liquidity.
 - Flows safer with VIX; more flighty with FFR; less change if banks "stronger"

Lots of Prior Literature

- GFSR, BIS QRs, Financial Stability Reports....
- Determinants of AE and EM capital flows
 - Forbes and Warnock (2012)
 - Fratzscher (2012)
 - Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski (2014)
 - Bruno and Shin (2015)
 - Correa, Paligorova, Sapriza and Zlate (2015)
 - Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015)
 - McCauley, McGuire, Sushko (2015)

....adds to long literature concentrated on EM capital flows

- Main drivers of the "Global financial cycle":
 - Global Risk Conditions (VIX)
 - Monetary policy in advanced economies

Estimation: global and local drivers of capital flow Part 1

- Two main international components of the BIS Global Liquidity Indicators (CGFS, 2011) from the borrowing country perspective
 - Cross-border **loans** (from the BIS LBSR dataset)
 - International **debt securities** (from the BIS IDSS dataset)
 - o 2000:Q1 to 2013:Q4, 64 destination countries
- Estimate the impact of global (VIX, FFR) and local drivers of capital flows
- Test for structural change dates, pattern of changes

<u>Part 2</u>

- Introduce lending bank nationality dimension (BIS CBS data)
- Control for heterogeneity across lenders

<u>Part 3</u>

- Explain changes in the sensitivities
 - changed weights of countries in types of credit, versus changes in behaviors of types of creditors?
 - Can these changes be attributed to prudential policies in creditor countries, or ex ante balance sheet conditions of banks ?

XBL and IDS, typical lenders and borrowers

	Typical Lenders	Typical Borrowers	Notes
XB loans to banks	Internationally-active	Banks (all sizes)	Interbank market
	banks		(unsecured and repo)
XB loans to	Internationally-active	Large non-financial	Syndicated loan
nonbanks	banks	corporates;	market;
		exporting/importing	trade credit;
		firms;	project financing
		Leveraged non-bank	
		financials	
IDS issued by	Pension funds;	Large and mid-sized	Smaller investor base
banks	Insurance companies;	banks	than for IDS issued by
	Money Market Mutual		non-banks
	Funds;		
	Hedge funds		
IDS issued by non-	Pension funds;	Non-financial	Broader investor base
banks	Insurance companies;	corporates;	than for IDS issued by
	Mutual Funds;	governments;	banks
	Hedge funds	Insurance companies	

Empirical Methodology: Part 1

- Baseline estimation by borrowing country j:
 - $GrRateY_t^j =$

 $\boldsymbol{\beta_{1}} \Delta FFR_{t} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{2}} logVIX_{t} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{3}} \Delta logGDP_{t}^{j} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{4}} \Delta SovRating_{t}^{j} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{5}} ChinnIto_{t}^{j} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{6}} \Delta logGlobalGDP_{t} + \boldsymbol{\mu^{j}} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon_{t}^{j}}$

where Wu-Xia shadow rate is used fir 2009:q1-2013:Q4 (others used in robustness checks)

- Endogenously identify potential structural break points and test for their significance [Bai (1997) and Kurozumi (2002)]
 - Strong evidence of a structural break in Q1/2009 for both:
 - Cross-border loans and International debt securities
- Benchmark estimation with structural breaks:

•
$$GrRateY_t^j = \beta'X_t^j + \mu^j + I(t \ge T_{break}^Y)(\kappa + \gamma'X_t^j) + \varepsilon_t^j$$

Baseline model confirms prior literature

	Dependent variable:			Dependent variable:			
	ΔCı	ross-border	· loans	∆International debt securities			
Explanatory			to non-			by non-	
variables	All	to banks	banks	All	by banks	banks	
∆Fed funds rate	-1.88***	-2.07***	-2.11***	-1.35*	-1.34	-1.05	
Log(VIX)	-4.46***	-4.29***	-4.90***	-3.28***	-7.26***	-2.49***	
∆Real GDP	0.57***	0.60***	0.52***	0.19*	0.25	0.18	
Δ Sovereign rating	2.49**	4.21***	-0.57	1.46*	-1.83	1.15	
Chinn-Ito index	-0.12	-1.08	1.34	8.71***	13.45***	5.19	
∆Real global GDP	0.22	0.47*	0.10	-0.32	-0.62	-0.48	
Observations	2,903	2,903	2,903	2,903	2,572	2,902	
R-squared	0.12	0.08	10 0.08	0.06	0.03	0.04	

Benchmark model with structural breaks: post-crisis increase in FFR sensitivity; VIX sensitivity weaker on loans, stronger for IDS

	Dependent variable:		Dependent variable:		
	∆Cross-border loans		∆International debt securities		
Explanatory variables	to banks to non-banks		by banks	by non-banks	
Pre-break					
Log(VIX)	-4.36***	-4.32***	-5.58**	-0.23	
∆Fed funds rate	-3.36***	-3.39***	-1.19	-0.94	
Post-break					
Log(VIX)	-0.22	-2.52***	-3.39	-2.31*	
∆Fed funds rate	-8.36***	-5.19***	-14.67	-6.37***	

Changes in sensitivities, pre-versus post-crisis. Some convergence in bonds versus loans.

Fed Funds	Borrower		
Rate	Banks	Non-banks	
Loans (LBS)	Strengthens	Strengthens	
Bonds (IDS)	Strengthens	Strengthens	

VIX	Во	rrower
	Banks	Non-banks
Loans (LBS)	Weakens	Weakens
Bonds (IDS)	Weakens	Strengthens

β2

 β_1

Some convergence between XBL and IDS patterns. Good or bad development? Diverse business models now more similar?

	Borrower sector			
	ΔC	cross-border	loans	
Coefficients(XBL)-Coefficients(IDS)	All	Banks	Non-banks	
Pre-break				
Log(VIX)	-2.82***	1.22	-4.09**	
∆Fed funds rate	-1.70*	-2.17*	-2.46**	
Post-break				
Log(VIX)	1.41	3.17	-0.21	
∆Fed funds rate	0.07	6.31	1.19	

From borrower perspective, aggregated flows less flighty? Banks borrowers: Weaker sensitivity to VIX, stronger FFR. Nonbanks: Similar VIX, stronger FFR.

	-	dent variable:		
	∆Total cross-border flows (loans and debt securities)			
Explanatory variables	to banks	to non-banks		
Pre-break				
Log(VIX)	-3.24**	-2.69***		
∆Fed funds rate	-2.75***	-2.10***		
Post-break				
Log(VIX)	-0.84	-2.26***		
∆Fed funds rate	-7.69***	-5.67***		
Observations	2,572	2,902		
R-squared	0.128	0.121		
	1 /			

Disentangling the effects across advanced and emerging market economies: similar for both in x-border; differ for IDS.

	-	ident variable:Dependent varias-border loans∆International debt set		
Explanatory variables	Advanced economies	Emerging economies	Advanced economies	Emerging economies
Pre-break				
Log(VIX)	-4.02***	-4.18***	1.05	-3.90***
∆Fed funds rate	-2.18***	-4.56***	-2.54	-0.65
Post-break				
Log(VIX)	-1.70	-1.97	-0.63	-4.82***
∆Fed funds rate	-6.41***	-5.87***	-10.22***	-2.91*
Observations	1,479	1,424	1,479	1,424
R-squared	0.22	0.16	0.07	0.12

Part 2. Controlling for heterogeneity among lending banking systems

- The BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics (CBS) contains bilateral data which has information on both:
 - The country of the borrower
 - The nationality of the lending banking system
- Re-estimate all specifications using the bilateral CBS data.
 - $GrRateY_t^{ij} =$

 $\boldsymbol{\beta_{1}} \Delta FFR_{t} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{2}} logVIX_{t} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{3}} \Delta logGDP_{t}^{j} + \boldsymbol{\beta_{4}} \Delta SovRating_{t}^{j} + \beta_{5}ChinnIto_{t}^{j} + \beta_{6} \Delta logGlobalGDP_{t} + \boldsymbol{\theta^{i}} + \mu^{j} + \varepsilon_{t}^{ij}$

• $GrRateY_t^{ij} = \beta'X_t^j + \delta^{i'}Int_t^i + \delta^{j'}Int_t^j + \theta^i + \mu^j + I(t \ge T_{break}^Y)(\kappa + \gamma'X_t^j + \eta^{i'}Int_t^i + \eta^{j'}Int_t^j) + \varphi^i Pru_t^i + \varphi^j Pru_t^j + \varepsilon_t^{ij}$

CBS in benchmark model controls for lender fixed effects. Structural breaks are similar to LBS

	Dependent variable:]	Dependent variab	le:		
	Bank le	Bank lending (LBS)		Bank lending (CBS)			
Explanatory variables	to banks	to non-banks	to banks	to non-banks (private)	to the public sector		
Pre-break							
Log(VIX)	-4.36***	-4.32***	-4.99***	-2.96***	-1.30		
∆Fed funds rate	-3.36***	-3.39***	-0.31	-1.82***	-0.87*		
Post-break							
Log(VIX)	-0.22	-2.52***	-3.57***	-2.67***	-4.77***		
∆Fed funds rate	-8.36***	-5.19***	-5.72***	-4.35***	-8.51***		

Changes in sensitivities, pre- vs post-crisis

Fed Funds rate	Borrower				
	Banks	Non-banks			
Bank lending (LBS)	Strengthens	Strengthens			
Bank lending (CBS)	Strengthens	Strengthens			
Bonds (IDS)	Strengthens	Strengthens			
VIX	Borrower				
	Banks	Non-banks			
Bank lending (LBS)	Weakens Weakens				

 β_1

 β_2

	Danks	NOT BAIKS
Bank lending (LBS)	Weakens	Weakens
Bank lending (CBS)	Weakens	Constant
Bonds (IDS)	Weakens	Strengthens

Part 3. What can account for the post-crisis changes?

Lending national banking systems have distinct betas. Sensitivities from a borrower perspective may be driven by change in country composition of lenders. Already document shift from bank to non-banks.

Lenders may have changed their sensitivities.

Perhaps role for prudential policies or ex ante balance sheet advantage.

$$GrRateY_t^{i,j} = \beta_1 \Delta FFR_t + \beta_2 logVIX_t + \cdots$$

• $\Delta\beta_k$ has a structural component and a compositional component

$$\beta_k = \sum_i \left\{ w_{t-1}^{i,j} \beta_t^{i,j} \right\}$$

• where i = individual lending national banking systems and $w_{t-1}^{i,j} =$ share of outstanding stock of loans of lenders from *i* to borrowers in j


$$\Delta\beta_k = \sum_i (\Delta\beta_k^i) \cdot w_{post}^i + \beta^i \cdot (\Delta w^i)$$

 Relate each change component to ex ante capital ratios of banking systems, prudential policies


Lending national banking system weights

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Banks




Non-bank private sector



Sources: BIS consolidated banking statistics; authors' calculations.


Decomposing the shifts in sensitivities to US MP

- In XBL, the behavioural component accounts for the overwhelming majority of the shifts in sensitivities to US monetary policy based on preand post-crisis averages
- The pattern holds across all borrowing sectors



Decomposing the shifts in sensitivities to the VIX


- Behavioural and compositional components **tend to offset** each other.
 - Behavioural component dominates for lending to the public and the non-bank private sectors
 - Compositional component dominates interbank lending



Examining the role of prudential actions

- Database on Changes in Prudential Policy Instruments collaboration between IMF and IBRN
 - Cerutti, Correa, Fiorentino and Segalla (2015)
- We focus on three types of prudential instruments (in impulse and cumulative forms)

Changes in prudential policies



Source: Cerutti et al (2015).

Cross-border lending sensitivities: Ex ante capital ratios of lenders important for ex post changes in sensitivities

	Dependent variable:			Depe	endent variab	ole:
	Structura	al change ir	1 the	Structural cl	hange in the c	coefficient
	coefficient f	or ∆Fed fu	nds rate	fe	or Log(VIX)	
	$eta_1^{PostBre}$	$e^{ak} - \beta_1^{PreE}$	3reak	β_2^{PostE}	$\beta^{Preak} - \beta_2^{Preb}$	Break
Explanatory variables	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)
Pre-break Capital ratio (2008)	0.45**	0.58***	0.40*	0.47*	0.48*	0.47*
Pre-break Prudential index (2008)	0.52			-0.32		
Pre-break LTV index (2008)		-0.64			-0.75	
Pre-break Local reserve requirement index (2008)			2.72***			-0.70
Sectoral fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	87	87	87	87	87	87
Q	186.3	185.9	174.2	212.6	217.6	213.3
Degrees of Freedom test Q	82	82	82	82	82	81
I^2	0.56	0.56	0.53	0.61	0.62	0.62
τ^2	23.12	22.92	18.83	25.22	25.62	25.40
Adjusted R-squared	13.73	12.60	21.27	15.34	15.17	16.88

Determinants of changes in cross border lending national banking system weights: higher role for systems with ex-ante high capital ratios, deposit funding shares, local claims share.

	Dependent variable: Change in lending national banking system weights $w^{Postbreak} - w^{PreBreak}$		
Explanatory variables	(I)	(II)	(III)
Pre-break Capital ratio (2008)	0.0016*	0.0015**	0.001
Pre-break Deposits to total funding ratio (2008)	0.0002**	0.0002**	0.0001**
Pre-break Average bank size (2008)	0.004	0.004	0.004
Local claims over Foreign claims (2008)	0.02*	0.02*	0.03**
Pre-break Prudential index (2008)	-0.001		
Pre-break LTV index (2008)		-0.004	
Pre-break Local reserve requirement index (2008))		0.0054**
Sectoral fixed effects	yes	yes	yes
Observations	75	75	75
Adjusted R-squared	0.08	0.08	0.12


Conclusions

- After global financial crisis, shift in international capital flows
 - away from bank lending
 - toward direct market financing.
- Global liquidity drivers are the same, but loss of heterogeneity
 - Sensitivity to US monetary policy has increased dramatically.
 - Sensitivity to global risk conditions converging:
 - increased significantly for international bonds flows
 - declined for cross-border loan flows.
- Shifts due to:
 - Compositional changes across international bank creditor countries
 - Changes in behaviors
 - Ex ante balance sheet strength matters, prudential policy weaker role
- Are flows safer? Flightiness to monetary policy stronger, and risk off potential converging between bank financing to direct market financing.

Thank you!

Cross-border loans and international debt securities

Annual growth rates, in per cent



Sources: BIS locational banking statistics; BIS International Debt Securities Statistics.